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Introduction  
n October 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Shaun McCutcheon v. 
Federal Election Commission (McCutcheon), a case that challenges federal limits on the 
grand total an individual can contribute to federal candidates, political parties, and political 
action committees (PACs). In Part 1 of this two-part series, we examine several options 
available to the court and how potential outcomes could transform how candidates and 
parties can raise money.  
Under current law, individuals can donate as much as 
$123,200 per election cycle to regulated federal political 
committees, with a $48,600 cap on aggregate 
contributions to candidates and a $74,600 cap on 
aggregate contributions to PACs and political parties.1 
[See Table 1, page 7] The challengers in McCutcheon 
attack the constitutionality of each of these three 
aggregate limits. Meanwhile, caps of $2,600 to any single 
candidate per election, $5,000 to any PAC per year, 
$10,000 to any state political party committee per year, 
and $32,400 to any national political party committee 
per year are not being challenged by McCutcheon. 
This paper will illustrate that even though contribution 
limits to individual candidates, political parties, and PACs 
will remain intact, a decision by the court to eliminate 
aggregate limits would have a profound effect on the 
amounts of money that elected officials and political 
party leaders are able to solicit from individual donors. A 
full repeal of aggregate limits would enable a single 
donor to write a nearly $6 million check to a joint 
fundraising committee controlled by an elected official or party leader. Even if the court 
were to put in place a hybrid system that retained aggregate limits on donations to parties 
but eliminated aggregate limits for candidates, donors could still write a single check to a 
joint fundraising committee of more than $2.5 million. The court should consider these 
practical realities as it considers how to rule on McCutcheon. 
 
                                                             
1 Contribution Limits Chart, 2013-2014, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (viewed December 30, 2013), 
http://1.usa.gov/1ggdyit.  
I 
A Supreme Court decision in 
McCutcheon to eliminate aggregate 
limits on campaign contributions 
could enable a single donor to 
write a single $5.9 million check to 
a fundraising committee controlled 
by an elected official or party 
leader. 
Even if the court maintains 
aggregate limits on donations to 
party committees but eliminates 
aggregate limits on contributions to 
candidates — an outcome some 
have suggested in light of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ comments at oral 
argument — a donor would be 
enabled to write a single check of 
$2.5 million to a fundraising 
committee. 
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Background 
In the past, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of campaign contribution 
limits because unrestricted contributions would pose an unacceptable risk of corruption. In 
its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the court determined that the corruption threat posed 
by permitting unlimited contributions outweighs the First Amendment concerns implicit in 
establishing limits.2 
“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from 
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined,” the court wrote in Buckley, which upheld contribution limits 
established by post-Watergate amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act.3 
“Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the 
deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem 
is not an illusory one.” 
The argument that the plaintiffs have put forth in McCutcheon is that there is no anti-
corruption rationale for limiting the total amount a person may give to all candidates and 
parties so long as the limits on the amount of each contribution to a candidate or party 
remain intact. Therefore, they argue, aggregate limits violate the First Amendment within 
the rubric established by Buckley. Supporters of aggregate limits respond that eliminating 
aggregate caps on contributions to party entities and candidates would destroy the 
integrity of caps on contributions to individual party entities because, among other 
reasons, donations to the various state and national committees of the major parties are 
tantamount to gifts to a single entity.4 
In the abstract, the argument for eliminating caps on contributions to individual candidates 
might seem appealing when evaluated through the court’s anti-corruption rationale in 
Buckley. How, the law’s challengers ask, would a $5,200 contribution to one candidate be 
more likely to corrupt her if the donor also gave the same amount to every other 
congressional candidate? Questions posed by Chief Justice John Roberts during oral 
arguments of McCutcheon created speculation that he might favor a decision that would 
maintain the cap on aggregate contributions to parties while eliminating it for 
contributions to candidates. 
                                                             
2Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
3 Id, at 26-27.  
4 Brief for Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Rep. David Price (D-N.C.). as Amicus Curiae Supporting the 
Appellee (2013) at 26-27, Shaun McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (argued before the U.S. Supreme 
Court October 8, 2013), http://bit.ly/1d5gT0U. 
Public Citizen Beware of a Naive Perspective: Part 1 of 2 
 
January 7, 2014 5 
 
This paper will illustrate that any theoretical reasoning that could justify striking down the 
aggregate cap on contributions to candidates should be trumped by the practical realities 
of how such a change could play out in the real world. In short, eliminating any caps on 
aggregate contributions is likely to erode the integrity of limits on contributions to 
individual entities because of the existence of joint fundraising committees, which allow 
enormous donations to be given to a single recipient that, in turn, apportions the money 
among multiple entities. If limits on aggregate contributions were lifted, donors would have 
far more freedom to write checks sufficiently large to elevate the risk of quid pro quo 
corruption. For this reason, Buckley’s reasoning requires the court to uphold the aggregate 
limits. 
Options for the Court in McCutcheon 
The court could rule in several ways. First, it could reject the plaintiffs’ argument outright, 
thereby maintaining the existing limits on aggregate contributions. Second, and conversely, 
it could accept the plaintiffs’ argument and eliminate all aggregate limits, thereby 
abolishing the $123,200 biennial limit as well as the separate sub-limits for candidates and 
political and party committees.  
There is a third possibility, however. The court could preserve some aggregate limits, such 
as those applied to donations to political parties, while eliminating others, such as those to 
candidates. The court might adopt this hybrid option based on the theory that national, 
state, district, and local party committees are aligned by the same common goal of getting 
candidates of the same party elected to office. Because of this common goal, contributions 
to any state or local party committee are functionally a contribution to one entity. 
Candidates, meanwhile, are individuals. Thus, a Supreme Court justice might see 
justification in striking down the aggregate limit on contributions to candidates, but not to 
parties.  
Speculation that the court might adopt this hybrid approach was heightened during oral 
arguments when Chief Justice John Roberts, whom some expect to be the swing vote, asked 
if it would be possible to eliminate the aggregate limit for contributions to candidates while 
keeping in place other aggregate limits, such as those to political parties and PACs.5 Roberts 
expressed some skepticism that the law should prevent an individual from donating to 
each of his or her preferred candidates, even if those contributions cumulatively exceeded 
the existing aggregate threshold.  
                                                             
5 Amy Howe, The Chief Justice Looks for a Compromise on Contribution Caps? This Morning’s Argument in Plain 
English, SCOTUSBLOG (October 8, 2013), http://bit.ly/1bgqenb. 
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Roberts questioned the need to limit the number of candidates to whom a person could 
donate the maximum allowed by the limits on contributions to individual candidates, 
saying, “…we haven’t talked yet about the effect of the aggregate limits on the ability of 
donors to give … to as many candidates as they want. The effect of the aggregate limits is to 
limit someone’s contribution of the maximum amount to about nine candidates, right?”6 
Roberts seemed to be questioning whether it was justified that a donor could be prohibited 
from donating the maximum amount to more candidates than permitted by the aggregate 
limits.  
However, Roberts suggested a desire to retain some aggregate limits while granting 
individuals the freedom to contribute the maximum to as many candidates as they want. 
“Is there a way to eliminate [the aspect of current law that prohibits a person giving the 
maximum contribution to more than nine candidates] while retaining some of the 
aggregate limits?” Roberts asked. “In other words, is that a necessary consequence of any 
way you have aggregate limits? Or are there alternative ways of enforcing the aggregate 
limitation that don’t have that consequence?”7 Roberts appeared to be searching for a 
solution that would eliminate aggregate caps on donors’ contributions to candidates while 
preserving aggregate limits on other types of contributions, including those to party 
committees and PACs.  
Potential Implications 
A complete elimination of aggregate limits would permit a donor to give as much as $5.9 
million to the various committees, candidates, and leadership PACs of a single party, 
according to our analysis. Eliminating aggregate contribution limits just on the amount a 
donor may give to candidates (not parties and PACs) would effectively raise the total 
amount that a donor intent on aiding candidates from a single party might give from the 
current cap of $48,600 to more than $2.5 million. [See Table 1] 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 Shaun McCutcheon, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (2013), at 14, http://1.usa.gov/1kceFzf.  
7 Id.   
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Table 1: Potential Contribution Limits Under Hypothetical McCutcheon Outcomes, 2013-2014 
Scenario 
To each 
candidate or 
candidate 
committee, 
per election 
To national 
party 
committee, 
per year 
To state, 
district, and 
local party 
committee, 
per year 
To any other 
political 
committee, 
per year 
Special Limits 
Option 1: Maintain Current Law $2,6008 $32,400 
$10,000 
(combined 
limit) 
$5,000 
$123,200 biennial limit: 
 $48,600 to all candidate 
committees 
 $74,600 to all PACs and parties9 
Option 2: No Aggregate Limits $2,600 $32,400 
$10,000 
(combined 
per state) 
$5,000 
$5,918,400 biennial limit10 
 $2,444,000 to candidate 
committees 
 $1,194,400 to party committees 
 $2,280,000 to Leadership PACs11 
Option 3: “Hybrid Option;” No 
aggregate limit on candidates, 
limits remain for PACs and parties 
$2,600 $32,400 
$10,000 
(combined 
limit) 
$5,000 
$2,518,600 biennial limit12; 
 $2,444,000 to all candidates 
 $74,600 to all PACs and parties 
 
Joint Fundraising Committees Would Heighten the Risk of 
Corruption Stemming From Elimination of Aggregate Caps 
A decision that lifts even some of the aggregate limits would transform how candidates 
raise money and diminish the effectiveness of caps on contributions to candidates. In part, 
this is because campaign finance law permits the existence of joint fundraising committees, 
or JFCs, which facilitate donors giving large checks to a single recipient.  
JFCs are one of the most popular vehicles for fundraising. They collect large contributions, 
then distribute the money to a variety of candidates and party committees in amounts 
                                                             
8 The limit is effectively $5,200 because donors can contribute to both a candidate’s primary and general 
election campaign. 
9 Only $48,600 of this amount may be contributed to state and local party committees and PACs. 
10 This figure was derived from a Public Citizen analysis of campaign finance laws and potential changes to 
those laws. The analysis assumed a donor would contribute the maximum in a two-year election cycle to 435 
House candidates, 34 Senate candidates (representing a major party candidate for each contest), as well as to 
a presidential candidate, all 50 state party committees, and three national party committees (for example, the 
DNC, DCCC, and DSCC). Additionally, there were 456 leadership PACs active in 2012. We are assuming that 
these leadership PACs have an equal partisan split. Thus, a donor seeking to aid the fortunes of one party 
could contribute the maximum $10,000 per cycle to about 228 leadership PACs. See 2012 Leadership PACs, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (viewed November 26, 2013), http://bit.ly/ojbbol. 
11 This number effectively has no limit as there are potentially an unlimited number of PACs. However, for the 
sake of this analysis, we used leadership PACs as they have been used in joint fundraising committees before. 
Leadership PACs are political committees established by elected officials and party members that can collect 
up to $5,000 per donor per calendar year. Leadership PACs can accept funds from other political committees, 
businesses, and individuals. These funds can then be distributed to candidate committees of individuals 
running for office. See Leadership PACs—Background, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (viewed December 17, 
2013), http://bit.ly/1fBpGKz.  
12 Public Citizen’s analysis assumed a donor would contribute the maximum to 435 House races, 34 Senate 
races, and a presidential race. Aggregate contributions to national party committees, state, district and local 
committees, and other political committees would remain limited to $74,600 per cycle, per donor. 
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subject to applicable individual and aggregate contribution limits. In 2012, President 
Obama established a JFC, called the Obama Victory Fund, which solicited checks as large as 
$75,800.13 [See Figure 1]  
Portions of these contributions were then 
allocated according to a pre-determined 
formula to President Obama’s campaign, 
the Democratic National Committee, and 
various state party committees. 14  The 
Obama Victory Committee raised more 
than $450 million for President Obama 
and other Democratic committees in 
2012.15 Republican Presidential nominee 
Mitt Romney established a similarly 
structured JFC that raised more than 
$490 million.16  
If the court eliminated some or all 
aggregate contribution limits, joint 
fundraising committees could take on an 
entirely new role because they would be 
able to receive vastly larger contributions 
than they currently can. Two distinct 
scenarios are possible. First, complete 
elimination of aggregate limits would plausibly permit a donor to contribute as much as 
$5.9 million to a single JFC. These contributions would then be parsed out to hundreds of 
candidates, parties and PACs according to a predetermined formula. [See Table 2; 
methodology explained in note.]  
 
 
                                                             
13 Paul Blumenthal, McCutcheon v. FEC’s Other Threat: Case Could Super-Size Joint Fundraising Committees, 
HUFFINGTON POST (October 7, 2013), http://huff.to/18m5xCW 
14 Paul Blumenthal, McCutcheon v. FEC’s Other Threat: Case Could Super-Size Joint Fundraising Committees, 
HUFFINGTON POST (October 7, 2013), http://huff.to/18m5xCW. See also Invitation to Fundraiser with First Lady 
Michelle Obama for the Obama Victory Fund, Friday, March 30, 2012 (viewed December 17, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/JDaFNJ.  
15 Joint Fundraising Committees, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (viewed December 4, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1eWkJeN. 
16 Id. 
Figure 1: A Fundraising Event With Michelle 
Obama for President Obama’s Joint 
Fundraising Committee, 2012 Election Cycle 
Figure 1: A Fundra sing Event With Michelle 
Obama for President Obama’s Joint 
Fundra sing Co mitt e, 2012 Election Cycle 
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Table 2: Hypothetical Contributions from a Single Donor to a JFC 
Recipient 
No Aggregate Limit on Any 
Contribution Type17 
No Aggregate Limit on 
Contributions to 
Candidates18 
House and Senate Candidates 
(General and Primary Elections) 
$2,438,800 $2,438,800 
Presidential Candidate $5,200 $5,200 
National Party Committees $194,400 $74,600 
State/District/Local Party Committees $1,000,000 $0 
Other Political Committees $2,280,000 $0 
Total $5,918,400 $2,518,600 
 
Under the hybrid option that would lift the cap on aggregate contributions to candidates 
but maintain them for parties and other political committees, JFCs could ask donors to 
write checks as large as $2.5 million. These contributions would benefit the party’s 
presidential candidate, the national party committees, and 469 House and Senate 
candidates. [Figure 2 illustrates how the hybrid option might operate in practice.]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 Public Citizen’s analysis of campaign finance laws. The analysis assumed a donor would contribute the 
maximum to 435 House races and 34 Senate races, as well as to all 50 state party committees. The donor 
would also contribute $32,400 per year to each national party committee. Additionally, there were 456 
leadership PACs active in 2012. Assuming a 50 percent partisan split, a donor intent on aiding one party could 
contribute $10,000 per cycle to about 228 of these PACs. See 2012 Leadership PACs, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE 
POLITICS (viewed November 26, 2013), http://bit.ly/ojbbol.  
18 Public Citizen analysis of campaign finance laws. The analysis assumed a donor would contribute the 
maximum to 435 House races and 34 Senate races. Contributions to national party committees, state, district, 
and local committees, and other political committees would remain limited to $74,600 per cycle, per donor. 
(Though this analysis assumes the donor only contributes to the national party committees, he or she could 
allocate the $74,600 to those three groups differently.) 
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By greatly increasing the amounts 
that candidates and party leaders 
could solicit for their JFCs, a ruling in 
McCutcheon that loosened aggregate 
limits would increase the probability 
of quid pro quo corruption. Party 
leaders who also are elected officials 
(and are likely to spearhead JFCs) 
would inevitably remember donors 
who handed them seven-figure 
checks. And it would be naive to 
believe that party leaders or the 
candidates that benefited from funds 
funneled through JFCs would not be 
more likely to provide special favors 
to those donors.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Previously, the Supreme Court has expressed concern that large contributions to political 
parties could create indebtedness on behalf of elected officials. In McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, for example, the court wrote, “large … contributions to national 
parties are likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of federal 
officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ultimately used.”19 Because of the advent 
of JFCs, a decision that retained aggregate limits on contributions to political party 
committees while striking down aggregate limits on contributions to candidates would in 
practice more closely resemble a complete elimination of aggregate limits than their 
retention. The court should avoid taking a naïve perspective and acknowledge the practical 
result of either a full or partial elimination of aggregate limits: a campaign finance system 
that gives a small group of donors the opportunity to unduly influence party and elected 
officials. Part 2 of this series will illustrate how eliminating the aggregate limits on 
contributions to candidates alone could also erode the integrity of the aggregate limits on 
contributions to parties.  
                                                             
19 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 590 U.S. 93, at 155 (2003). 
Figure 2: Hypothetical Contributions to JFC, 
Hybrid Option 
